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Federal Taxation
by Robert Beard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the year 2011,' the courts addressed interesting issues in the areas
of constructive receipt, taxpayer standing to pursue non-monetary
damages, and lender liability for unpaid payroll taxes. This Article
surveys these decisions.
II.

UNITED STATES V. FORT

In United States v. Fort,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit dealt with the important issue of when assets held in
escrow should be treated as income by the beneficiary of the escrow.'
Though the decision in Fort rests on questionable reasoning, courts in
several circuits have reached similar decisions, so it represents a
significant trend.'
Fortwas one of a number of tax cases that arose from Ernst & Young's
(E&Y) 2000 sale of its consulting business to Cap Gemini.' In the sale,
a number of E&Y partners involved in the consulting business exchanged their interest in E&Y for shares of Cap Gemini and began
working for Cap Gemini.6 Seventy-five percent of the shares received
by each partner were restricted and held in an escrow account. A

* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
2004); Georgetown University (J.D., 2007); University of Florida, Frederic G. Levin College
of Law (L.L.M., 2011). Member, State Bar of Ohio.
1. For an analysis of federal tax cases decided during the prior survey period, see
Augustus N. Makris, FederalTaxation, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1187
(2010).

2.
3.
4.
5.

638 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1337.
See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009).
Fort, 638 F.3d at 1335; see Fletcher, 562 F.3d at 840; United States v. Nackel, 686

F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

6. Fort, 638 F.3d at 1335.
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portion of the shares could be sold at specified periods, and all shares
left escrow just under five years after the closing date. A portion of the
shares were forfeited if the partner resigned or was terminated for cause
or for poor performance. As a result of these restrictions, the affected
shares were valued at a discount in the sale agreement.
In disclosure documents distributed before the transaction, E&Y
partners were informed that the sale would be a taxable transaction and
that parties had agreed to consistently treat it as such. The taxpayer,
Fort, reported gain from the transaction on this basis on his 2000 tax
return.8
In 2003, the taxpayer was terminated from his position with Cap
Gemini, but because the termination was not for cause or for poor
performance, none of his shares were forfeited. After his termination,
Fort filed an amended return for 2000, in which he took the position that
the restricted receipt of the Cap Gemini shares did not give rise to
income in 2000. The Internal Revenue Service (the Service) initially
granted the refund but later sued to recover it.8
Two important issues were raised in Fort. The first issue was whether
the taxpayer, pursuant to the rule set forth in Commissioner v.
Danielson,"o was barred from attempting to recharacterize the transaction.n The second was whether, on the merits, the taxpayer had
income in 2000 from the Cap Gemini transaction. 2
A.

Commissioner v. Danielson
Substance over form is frequently an issue in tax,13 and Commissioner v. Danielson" recognized a significant asymmetry in the doctrine.'5
As noted in Danielson, the Service is free to assert that the substance of
a transaction is different from its form."6 Thus, the Service can treat
a putative lease as a secured loan or a sale if the facts justify. The
taxpayer, on the other hand, is almost always bound by the form of a
transaction. 7

7. Id. at 1335-36.
8. Id. at 1336.
9. Id. at 1336-37.
10. 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967).
11. Fort, 638 F.3d at 1337.
12. Id. at 1338.
13. See generally 1 BORIS 1. BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 914.3.3 (3d ed. 2003 & Supp. 3 2011).
14. 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967).
15. Id. at 774-75.

16. Id.
17. Id.
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In Danielson, the parties to a stock sale agreed to apportion the
consideration between the stock (which was a capital asset) and the
shareholders' covenant not to compete (which produced ordinary
However, in their returns, the shareholders took the
income)."
position that none of the consideration was allocable to the covenants not
to compete. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the taxpayer was not permitted to challenge the form
of his own transaction absent a showing of fraud, duress, or undue influence.o The court noted that permitting such challenges would severely
burden tax enforcement because the Service would be unable to rely on
the form of taxpayer transactions and would instead have to factually
investigate every relevant transaction."
In Fort, the government argued that the taxpayer's agreement to the
transaction, described in the disclosure documents, which included an
agreement that the transaction would be treated as a taxable sale,
estopped the taxpayer from later asserting that the transaction was not
taxable in 2000. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit disagreed. 2 The court held that Danielson only forbids the
taxpayer from challenging the agreed form of a transaction, not its tax
consequences."
The Danielson rule did not apply because Fort
accepted that the transaction was a sale; he only disputed its tax
consequences.2 4
B.

Constructive Receipt
The second issue in Fort was whether the taxpayer had constructive
receipt of the Cap Gemini shares when they were deposited in escrow in
2000.25 A cash-method taxpayer generally recognizes income when
money or property is actually or constructively received.26 The court
based its decision on constructive receipt. 27 Treasury Regulation
section 1.451-2(a) 28 provides that a taxpayer has constructive receipt of
property if it is "credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise
made available so that he may draw upon it at any time," but property

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 772-73.
Id. at 773-74.
Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 775.
Fort, 638 F.3d at 1337.
Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (2011).
Fort, 638 F.3d at 1338.
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (2011).
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is not constructively received if it is subject to "substantial limitations
or restrictions.""

The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Fort did have constructive receipt of
the escrow shares because he had sufficient control over the shares and
the conditions of forfeiture were largely under his control."o The court
identified three specific factors that established Fort's control over the
shares: (1) the shares were deposited in an escrow account for Fort's
benefit; (2) Fort had dividend and voting rights; and (3) the shares were
used as a guarantee for Fort's performance of future services.31 The
court also noted the fact that only about ten percent of the E&Y partners
had forfeited their shares and that avoiding termination for cause or for
poor performance was largely within Fort's control.
The Eleventh Circuit's reliance on a constructive receipt theory was
misplaced. The regulations and case law provide that an item is not
constructively received if there are substantial limitations on the
taxpayer's ability to take possession of the item.33 Thus, to hold that
Fort was in constructive receipt of the Cap Gemini shares, the court was
forced to come to the implausible conclusion that performance of nearly
five years of service (without termination for cause or poor performance)
is not a substantial restriction. Another district court considering the
same transaction made the same observation as follows:
Here, however, the restrictions involved concern matters exclusively
within the ex-consulting partner's hands to control. The only person
standing in the way of [the taxpayer] actually exercising dominion over
the shares themselves was himself. So long as he did not engage in
conduct amounting to cause to fire him, or did not quit his position at
the firm, or did not breach non-disclosure provisions, the shares in the
restricted escrow account were his.'
The proposition that a restriction is not substantial merely because it
is within the taxpayer's capability to fulfill is unprecedented and
unsupported. Indeed, performance of future services is the epitome of
a substantial restriction in other contexts. For example, in determining
whether property received for services is subject to a "substantial risk of
forfeiture" under section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.),35 the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Fort, 638 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1339.
Nackel, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
I.R.C. § 83 (2006).
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regulations provide that a requirement to provide substantial future
services is always such a risk.
Counterintuitively, the proper approach to the case would have been
to consider whether Fort had actual receipt of the shares. Though the
district court rejected this theory and the Service did not dispute the
finding," an actual receipt theory fits the facts far better than a
constructive receipt analysis. The shares were titled to a brokerage
account in Fort's name." Fort had dividend and voting rights over the
shares, and he was subject to the rise and fall of the value of the shares.
Fort's employment agreement stated that the shares would be forfeited
as damages in certain circumstances, which indicates that he was using
the shares as security for his performance." The simple fact that the
taxpayer had agreed not to sell the shares is not inconsistent with actual
possession of the shares.
In fact, most of the authorities cited by the court's decision deal with
actual receipt, not constructive receipt.40 Specifically, the courts in
Chaplin v. Commissioner" and Bonham v. Commissioner42 both held
that the taxpayers had actually received property." General Counsel
Memorandum 37,073,44 which the court in Fort cited for the importance
of evaluating the taxpayer's "degree of domination and control over the
assets in escrow," explicitly makes the point that degree of control is
relevant only to actual receipt, not constructive receipt.45
An actual receipt analysis emphasizes some points to which the
Eleventh Circuit gave little thought. One important factor, dismissed by
the court in a footnote, is that the liquidated damages due under Fort's

36. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (2011).
37. Fort, 638 F.3d at 1338.
38. Id. at 1335.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1339.
41. 136 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1943).
42. 89 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1937).
43. Chaplin, 136 F.2d at 302-03; Bonham, 89 F.2d at 728 (stating '[s]ince the title to
these 750 shares passed in 1929, they were properly included in estimating the gain in that
year from this exchange"). Neither opinion ever uses the phrase "constructive receipt."
44. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,073 (Mar. 31, 1977).
45. Fort, 638 F.2d at 1339; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,073.
We emphasize that defense should be based on the taxpayer's dominion and
control over the funds at issue . . .. Defense should not be based on constructive
receipt under Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 because until exercise of the above elections,
taxpayer's control over the funds was subject to substantial limitations; and once
either election was exercised, taxpayer's dominion and right to receive control over
the funds was the equivalent of actual receipt.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,073.
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employment agreement were to be calculated as a fixed number of
shares, not as a fixed monetary value.4 6 If the escrow was genuinely
intended to secure Fort's performance under the contract, the forfeiture
should be calculated to equal the other party's expected damages. In
Bonham, one of the cases relied on by the court, the taxpayer's potential
forfeiture would have taken the form of the escrow selling whatever
number of shares were required to produce sufficient proceeds to make
a fixed damages payment.4 ' General Counsel Memorandum 37,073
stressed the following point: 'The fact that the taxpayer might forfeit its
collateral does not present a substantial restriction or limitation on its
rights to receive the money so long as such collateralis forfeited on the
basis of its current value."' Fort's forfeiture was based on a fixed
number of shares, rather than market value, indicating that Fort did not
have all of the benefits and burdens of ownership.
Another important issue that was overlooked by the court was the
importance of the dividend and voting rights exercised by the taxpayer.
If the stock earned significant dividends and Fort, along with the other
former E&Y partners, exercised meaningful voting rights, then the case
for finding that Fort actually received the shares is strong. On the other
hand, if dividends were minimal and voting rights illusory, then the
ability to sell the stock, which Fort did not possess, may have been the
only economically significant right associated with the shares. Such a
circumstance would support a holding that Fort did not receive the
shares.
In reaching its decision, the court may have focused more on the
potential for abuse in the taxpayer's conduct than on the proper
technical treatment of the transaction. At the time of the transaction,
the taxpayer reported a completed sale, with a capital gain based on the
fair market value of Cap Gemini shares at that time. 49 Had Cap
Gemini shares increased in value, it is very unlikely that the taxpayer
would have amended his return to put forward a deferred receipt theory
because then his gain would have been calculated at the new, higher
value of Cap Gemini shares at receipt.o Only because the value of the
shares went down was it advantageous for the taxpayer to amend his
reporting. Despite the court's holding that the Danielson rule did not
bar the taxpayer's refund claim, the potential for abuse in allowing

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Fort, 638 F.3d at 1340 n.2.
Bonham, 89 F.2d at 727.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,073 (emphasis added).
Fort, 638 F.3d at 1336.
See Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(3) (2011).
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taxpayers to recharacterize their transactions based on retrospective
calculations may have influenced the court."
III.

CHRISTIAN COALITiON OF FLORIDA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Christian Coalition of Florida, Inc. v. United States52 tested the
limits of the taxpayer's ability to seek nonmonetary relief in court."
The Eleventh Circuit held that the scope for such relief is extremely
narrow, if it exists at all.54
Christian Coalition of Florida (CC-FL) is a Florida non-profit
corporation that was organized to "teach[] concern for the sanctity of life,
traditional family values, an economic system which fosters individual
self-reliance, and faith in God."" Lobbying and publishing "scorecards"
for legislators were major activities of CC-FL."
Because it engaged in lobbying activities, CC-FL could not qualify as
a I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)f charitable organization." Instead, it applied for
tax exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)" as an organization "operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare."o According to the
regulations, § 501(cX4) organizations are permitted to engage in lobbying
activities but may not support or oppose particular candidates for
office."
In 2000, the Service issued a proposed determination letter rejecting
CC-FL's application for tax exempt status, finding that its legislative
score cards and other activities amounted to electioneering.62 Issuance
of a final determination letter was suspended while an affiliated
organization litigated a similar issue against the Service in another case.
When the related case was ultimately concluded in 2008, the Service

51. Fort, 638 F.3d at 1337-38.
52. 662 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2011).
53. Id. at 1185.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
58. Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1185. Section 501(c)(3) only applies to
[an organization] no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
59. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
60. Id.; Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1185-86.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2011).
62. Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1186.

1274

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

issued a final determination letter finding that CC-FL did not qualify as
a § 501(c)(4) organization. CC-FL was instructed to file corporate tax
returns for prior years. CC-FL filed returns for 1991, 1994-2000, and
2005-2006.6' Because it was funded mostly by nontaxable gifts and
had no substantial income, CC-FL owed trivial amounts of tax,
approximately $250 for all relevant years. 4
After filing the returns, CC-FL requested a refund of all taxes paid,
challenging the Service's determination that it was not tax exempt.6"
The Service granted a refund for the 2005 and 2006 years without
explanation but failed to respond to the other requests within the
statutory response period. CC-FL sued for a refund of the remaining
years' taxes and, more importantly, for declaratory and injunctive relief.
Specifically, CC-FL requested declaratory judgments that it was a
§ 501(cX4) organization and that the restrictions on electioneering were
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, as well as an injunction against
the Service revoking its tax exempt status in future years.
After the litigation commenced, the Service concluded that the statute
of limitations had run for 1991 and the 1994-2000 period and, therefore,
refunded the taxes paid for those years." With all taxes refunded, the
Service claimed that the refund claim was moot and moved to dismiss
the case." CC-FL argued that its declaratory and injunctive claims
still constituted a live controversy. 69

A.

Legal Background

To promote efficient collection of taxes, judicial review of tax matters
is limited. By design, taxes are assessed and disputed primarily through
administrative processes. Thus, there are two main paths by which tax
disputes can come to court. First, after the Service issues a statutory
notice of deficiency, which follows the administrative audit process and
an optional administrative appeal, the taxpayer may challenge the
deficiency in the Tax Court.o Second, a taxpayer may administratively

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1186 n.2.
65. Id. at 1187.
66. Id.
67. Id. I.R.C. § 6501(gX2) provides that if an organization files a return as a tax
exempt organization in good faith, the return is sufficient to begin the statute of limitations
period even if the organization is later determined to be taxable. I.R.C. § 6501(g)(2) (2006).
The statute of limitations is three years from either the filing of the return or the due date
for the return, whichever is later. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2006).
68. Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1187-88.
69. Id. at 1190.
70. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2006).
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request a refund of any tax that has been paid, whether through selfassessment or as a result of an audit." If the Service does not grant
the refund, the taxpayer may file a refund suit before the appropriate
District Court or the Court of Federal Claims. 72 The Internal Revenue
Code provides for judicial review of various other limited matters as
Outside of these channels, judicial review of tax matters is
well.
prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act (the AIA), which provides that,
unless specifically provided in listed Internal Revenue Code sections, "no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
The Declaratory Judgment Act (the DJA)1
shall be maintained."
includes a corresponding provision prohibiting any declaratory relief for
tax matters except as allowed by I.R.C. § 7428."
The United States Supreme Court has enforced the terms of the AIA,
even in a situation where it did considerable harm to the taxpayer."
7
the taxpayer, which was a § 501(c)In Bob Jones University v. Simon,"
(3) charitable organization, sought an injunction to prevent the Service
from revoking its tax exempt status under a new policy that denied tax
exemption to racially discriminatory schools.o The Court held that the
AIA barred the claim for injunctive relief." The Court reached this
holding even though the taxpayer's § 501(c)(3) status had important
collateral consequences." Since the taxpayer was a charitable organization, donations were deductible.' If the Service revoked the taxpayer's determination letter, potential donors would have to risk audit to
As a practical matter, the
challenge the Service's determination.'
taxpayer would probably lose a substantial portion of its donations in
the absence of a favorable determination letter.

71. Id.
72. I.R.C. § 7422 (2006).
73. E.g., I.R.C. § 6330 (2006) (noting collections due process hearings); I.R.C. § 7428
(2006) (noting review of denial of § 501(c)(3) status); I.R.C. § 7429 (2006) (noting review of
jeopardy assessments).
74. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
75. Id.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
77. Id. § 2201(a); I.R.C. § 7428 (2006).
78. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 727 (1974).

79. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 726-27.
at 727.
at 727-28.
at 730-31.
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Despite this real risk of injury to the taxpayer, the Court held that the
AIA did not allow an injunction." Under the law as it then stood, Bob
Jones University's (BJU) only remedy was to wait for a revocation of the
determination letter and then either contest a notice of deficiency in the
The Court
Tax Court or pursue a refund claim for taxes paid.'
affirmed an earlier decision, Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co.," which required a taxpayer to make a two-part showing to avoid
the AIA: first, the taxpayer must show that it would suffer irreparable
injury; and second, the government's action must be "plainly without a
legal basis."88 BJU clearly failed to establish the second prong, and the
Court held that, however injurious the proposed Service action might be,
the AIA did not allow an injunction against it."
In a significant footnote, the Court softened this harsh ruling
slightly."o First, it noted that, in the specific context of § 501(c)(3)
organizations, the AIA might be unreasonable if an organization could
never obtain prospective recognition of its tax exempt status, because of
the effect on potential donors." Congress added § 7428 to address this
concern. 92 Second, the Court noted that BJU was seeking a preenforcement injunction and noted that its approach might be different
in a refund case." CC-FL relied heavily on this footnote.94
Opinion
In Christian Coalition, CC-FL took the position that, having filed a
valid refund suit, the AIA was satisfied and all forms of relief, including
injunctive relief, were available." First, CC-FL argued, the case was
not moot merely because the Service had issued the requested refund
because the injunctive and declaratory questions were still open."
Second, CC-FL argued that the refund claim itself was not moot because
the Service's determination had state tax consequences and because its
refund claim satisfied judicial exceptions to the mootness doctrine."
B.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 730.
370 U.S. 1 (1962).
Simon, 416 U.S. at 745 (citing Enocks, 370 U.S. at 6-7).
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 748 n.22.
Id.
Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1192.
Simon, 416 U.S. at 748 n.22.
Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1192.
Id. at 1190.
Id.
Id. at 1193.
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Circuit Judge Marcus delivered the opinion in Christian Coalition."
The court rejected CC-FL's argument that declaratory and injunctive
99
claims could continue in the absence of a continuing refund claim.
The court held that the congressional response to the decision in Bob
Jones reflected no intent to allow such claims to proceed.'o In particular, the court noted that Congress added § 7428 to address the Supreme
Court's concern about the harmful impacts of the AIA and the DJA on
The fact that no further amendments
§ 501(cX3) organizations.'
were made to the AIA and the DJA to address other situations implied
that Congress did not intend to allow such suits to proceed.
The court also rejected CC-FL's argument that the collateral consequences of the Service's determination should allow its claims to
continue. 0 2 The court held that these consequences were not sufficient
to permit the court to carve out a judicial exception to its interpretation
of the DJA and the AIA.10 ' The court also noted that, if such claims
were sufficient to give courts jurisdiction over declaratory claims, then
any would-be tax exempt organization could seek declaratory relief,
effectively vitiating the tax exception to the DJA.o The court also
noted that a judicial exception to the AIA already existed under Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.'o0 and that CC-FL simply failed
to meet this standard. 06
Finally, CC-FL claimed that its refund claim was not moot, even
though the Service had repaid the tax money. 07 CC-FL asserted that
two judicial exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. 0 8 First, it
cited the "capable of repetition" doctrine, which holds that a challenge
to an action is not moot if the action is too short in duration to be
litigated before it becomes moot and if there is a reasonable expectation
that the plaintiff will be subject to the same action again.' 9 The court
rejected this doctrine, holding that nothing about the tax collection made
it too short in duration to allow for full litigation of the claim." 0 The

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id. at 1193-94.
370 U.S. 1 (1962).
ChristianCoal., 662 F.3d at 1194.
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1195-96.
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court also held that the taxpayer's tax liability for each taxable year was
an independent cause of action, which meant that the taxpayer could not
be subject to the "same action" in the future, but only a similar one."'
CC-FL's second claim was that the Service's decision to refund the
taxes was a voluntary cessation of unlawful conduct, which does not
render a claim moot unless the defendant can demonstrate that the
unlawful conduct is unlikely to recur."2 The court rejected this claim
because the Service had not conceded that CC-FL was exempt from taxes
in the years at issue."' Rather, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider
the substantive issue and the taxes were barred by the statute of
limitations."'
Interestingly, the court specifically declined to address the issue of
whether injunctive or declaratory relief would be appropriate in the
context of a live refund claim."' Instead, the court adopted a narrower holding: the AIA and the DJA prohibit suits consisting solely of claims
for declarative or injunctive relief."6 However, the court's opinion was
hostile to CC-FL's attempts to avoid the AIA and the DJA, suggesting
that, even if the refund claim were live, the court would have been
7
reluctant to allow the injunctive and declaratory claims to proceed."
More importantly, nothing in the text or policy of the AIA or the DJA
suggests that prohibited injunctive and declaratory claims are acceptable
in the context of a refund claim."' Accordingly, Christian Coalition
suggests that, even in a refund case, declaratory and injunctive relief are
not available.
IV.

UNITED STATES V. GE HFS HOLDINGS, INC.

In United States v. GE HFS Holdings, Inc.," the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida resolved a technical
question regarding the statute of limitations for lender liability actions
for unpaid employment taxes.120 Because employment taxes are
withheld from the wages of employees, there is a special concern that
financially troubled employers might use the withheld sums as a

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1185.
See id. at 1190-96.
See I.R.C. § 7 421(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
No. 8:10-cv-231-T-33TBM, 2011 WL 5525360 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2011).
Id. at *7-8.
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convenient source of illicit financing for their businesses. To protect the
Treasury and employees from unscrupulous expropriation, the Code
gives the Service several additional remedies to collect unpaid employment taxes. 2 1 Though the most significant of these remedies is the
trust fund recovery penalty, which allows the Service to collect the
unpaid taxes from responsible executives or directors of the employer,
I.R.C. § 3505(b)122 allows unpaid employment taxes to be collected from
"[a] lender, surety, or other person" who finances a wage payment
knowing that no employment taxes would be withheld. 123
The controversy in GE HFS Holdings arose from a 1997 loan
agreement between Heller Healthcare Finance, Inc. (Heller) and NuMed
In 2000, NuMed went into
Home Health Care, Inc. (NuMed).'x"
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. During the proceedings, the government filed
an adversary proceeding against Heller to determine the priority of their
liens, Heller's under the loan agreement and the government's for
unpaid taxes. The government also added a § 3505(b) lender liability
claim, but it was ultimately dismissed because the bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the tax liability of a non-debtor. 2 1
In 2010, the government reasserted its lender liability claim against
Heller (now GE HFS Holdings, Inc.). Heller contended that the claim
was outside the applicable statute of limitations.12 Treasury Regulation § 31.3505-1(d)(1)" 7 (after optimistically setting out procedures for
voluntary payment of the tax) provides that the government may collect
on the lender's liability within ten years of the assessment of the tax on
the employer.' 8
Treasury Regulation § 31.3505-1(d)(3)129 provides
that the limitations period can be extended by agreement. 3 o
Since more than ten years had passed since the majority of the
employment taxes at issue had been assessed against NuMed, the
government needed to argue that the statute of limitations had been
tolled or extended. Since the taxpayer had not agreed to an extension,
as allowed by Treasury Regulation § 31.3505-1(d)(3), the government
instead analogized to the general tax collection statute, I.R.C. § 6502-

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

I.R.C. § 6672 (2006).
I.R.C. § 3505(b) (2006).
Id.; Treas. Reg. § 31-3505-1(b)(1) (2011).
2011 WL 5525360, at *1.
Id. at *2-3.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3505-1(d)(1) (2011).
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3505-1(d)(3) (2011).
Id.
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(a),1 s' which provides for a ten-year collection period for "any tax
Under I.R.C. § 6503(h),1s3 the ten-year
imposed by this title."'
period of § 6502 is suspended during the pendency of a bankruptcy
case."' The Government took the position that the period for collecting
the lender-liability tax was suspended during the NuMed bankruptcy
case and that the collection action against Heller was therefore
timely. 3
The Government's position drew support from the Seventh Circuit in
dicta in United States v. Associates Commercial Corp.'36 In Associates
Commercial Corp., the Government similarly attempted to collect
employment taxes from a lender to a bankrupt employer. The lender
made two arguments: that the statute of limitations had expired and
that the Government had failed to give required notice and demand for
payment."' The court held that notice to a lender was required but
suggested in dicta that the suit would have been timely because the
statute of limitations had been tolled by the employer's bankruptcy and
that the limitations period for the lender liability tax should be
"coterminous" with that of the primary taxpayer.3 s The notice holding
of the Seventh Circuit was eventually overruled by the Supreme Court,
but the dicta regarding the statute of limitations was not discussed. 39
In GE HFS Holdings, the Middle District of Florida held that the dicta
in Associates was not controlling over the plain language of § 3505 and
the associated regulation. 4 0 The court was further persuaded by the
fact that, since Associates, the § 3505 statute of limitations provision had
been amended to extend its length and to provide for tolling the
limitations period by agreement.14' The fact that a bankruptcy-tolling
provision was not also added strongly suggested that no such provision
was intended.'4 2 This holding accorded with a 1988 decision of the
Ninth Circuit addressing the same issue. 43
131. I.R.C. § 6502(a) (2006).
132. Id.; GE HFS Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 5525360, at *4.
133. I.R.C. § 6503(h) (2006).
134. Id.
135. GE HFS Holdings,Inc., 2011 WL 5525360, at *4.
136. 721 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1983), overruled by Jersey Shore State Bank v. United
States, 479 U.S. 442 (1987).
137. Id. at 1095-96.
138. Id. at 1097-98.
139. GE HFS Holdings, 2011 WL 5525360, at *6; Jersey Shore State Bank, 479 U.S. at
446 & n.5.
140. GE HFS Holdings, 2011 WL 5525360, at *6.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *7.
143. Id.; United States v. Harvis Constr. Co., 857 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The Government also argued that the relationship between the
employer liability and the lender liability should create a unified
limitations period.'" In United States v. Galletti,1" the Supreme
Court held that parties that were secondarily liable for a tax under state
law should be subject to the same assessment procedures and statute of
limitations as the primary taxpayer.'46 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
this argument based on significant differences between the employer's
liability under I.R.C. § 6673... and the lender's § 3505(b) liability.1 48
The court noted several such differences: the fact that the lender liability
is only 25% of the unpaid tax, the fact that the lender is not subject to
penalties, and the fact that collection procedures are different. 49
The holding of GE HFS Holdings is technical and involves an obscure
Code section, but its practical application may be broader than it
initially seems. Since the lender liability tax only comes into play when
a primary taxpayer has misappropriated payroll taxes and the taxes
cannot be recovered, tolling of the statute of limitations in bankruptcy
will almost always be relevant. Moreover, in such cases a lender may
be the only solvent party the Government can hope to recover the lost
taxes from. Thus, the question of when exactly lender liability is
foreclosed by the statute of limitations is significant for both lenders and
the Government.
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GE HFS Holdings, 2011 WL 5525360, at *6-7.
541 U.S. 114 (2004).
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